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informativeness, and offers some informal discussion on how a theistic 
explanation might rise to the standard of success. Dawes concludes,
if on a number of the criteria we give the theist the benefit of the doubt, we 
cannot exclude the bare possibility that there might one day exist a suc-
cessful theistic explanation. As things stand, for instance, proposed theistic 
explanations are not consistent with the rest of our knowledge. (144)
But, again, how so? Are the conclusions of theistic proofs excluded a priori 
from “our knowledge”? Do we know that the full range of a posteriori 
and a priori arguments for God’s existence fail to yield anything rising to 
the level of knowledge? Is non-inferential knowledge of God ruled out 
as well? As we’ve already noted, intentional theistic explanations do not 
conflict with naturalistic explanations in any obvious way; they do not 
conflict any more than explanations in terms of purposes for events con-
flict with explanations in terms of efficient causes for events. So we are 
left with no obvious way in which proposed theistic explanations are sup-
posed to be inconsistent with what we know.
Theism and Explanation is undeniably a well-written and highly accessible 
book. Dawes’s approach to theories of explanation in general, and theistic 
explanation in particular, makes for easy reading. The tradeoff is that the 
details of his account of explanation, theistic and otherwise, lose some clar-
ity and the discussion loses some depth. The tension between naturalistic 
and theistic explanations, for instance, is not obvious. And the motivation 
for offering a theistic explanation—which might have been found in some 
version of the principle of sufficient reason—is obscure. But for readers in-
terested in an introduction to some of these important and complex issues, 
Theism and Explanation offers an easy way into the discussion.
Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians 
on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology, by Thomas McCall. Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2010. Pp. 256. $30 (paperback).
DALE TUGGY, SUNY Fredonia
This is a unique, stimulating and yet unsatisfying book which should be 
widely read. The answers to the questions in the title, respectively: (1) ei-
ther a “social” or a constitution theory, (2) Richard Bauckham’s. McCall is 
a theologian well versed in analytic philosophy. This book attempts, with 
some success, to bridge the cultural, intellectual, and institutional divides 
between Christian philosophers and theologians. McCall notes that the 
book “will at points be less than satisfying to partisans in both camps” (8).
In chapter 1, he nicely summarizes much recent positive work on Trinity 
theories by Christian philosophers, as well as some anti-“social”-theory 
arguments. In the next two chapters he sets out to correct the oversights 
and misunderstandings of various of these philosophers by endorsing 
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Richard Bauckham’s thesis that the earliest Christians “understood [Jesus] 
to be included in the identity of the one God” (57). New Testament era 
Judaism was “strictly monotheistic,” and yet Christians properly wor-
shiped Jesus. In my view McCall is too confident that the New Testament 
supports all these claims. His treatment of the source material (56–72) is 
perfunctory, and will be unsatisfying to those familiar with competing in-
terpretations. The last part of chapter 2 gives helpful expositions of what 
ancient Arianism and modalism really amounted to (as contrasted with 
the ways some philosophers have thrown around those heresy-terms).
In chapter 3 McCall rejects the apparent modalism of Barth and Rahner 
(87–89), and returns to the theories of chapter 1. Utilizing the fruits of 
chapter 2, McCall rebuts Leftow’s charge that a “social” theory is “Ari-
anism” (95–98). McCall admits that it is unclear how well this “social” 
approach coheres with the Western tradition, especially the “Athana-
sian” creed and theories of divine simplicity (98–103). He rejects rela-
tive identity theories because in his view they don’t get us far enough 
from modalism and metaphysical antirealism, while he dubs the Rea and 
Brower “constitution” theory “promising” (109); in his view it faces no 
theological problems, but a few philosophical ones. He rejects Leftow’s 
“Latin” theory on the grounds of unclarity, of misfit with the Bible, and 
that it likely cannot avoid modalism (111–121). In chapter 3 and later in 
the book, McCall defends what most would call a “social” theory; we’ll 
return below to this positive thrust.
Chapter 4 sympathetically critiques theologian Robert Jenson’s Trinity 
theory, founded on this non sequitur (in Jenson’s words): “since the bibli-
cal God can truly be identified by narrative, his hypostatic being, his self-
identity, is constituted in dramatic coherence” (132). Thus, “the one God is 
an event; history occurs not only in him but as his being” and “God is the 
event of the world’s transformation by Jesus’s love” (ibid.) McCall points 
out what is plausibly a confusion about identity underlying Jenson’s proj-
ect (132–155). Jensonians will want to take a close look at McCall’s friendly 
suggestions for amending the theory.
Chapter 5 sympathetically critiques the theological font of much recent 
social-trinity theorizing, Jurgen Moltmann. McCall convincingly argues 
that Moltmann’s doctrine of “perichoresis” (applied by him both to intra-
Trinity relations, and to God-world relations) “either does ‘not enough’ 
or does ‘too much’” (157)—that is, it doesn’t do enough to show how the 
three divine persons amount to one god, and it amounts to a God-world 
relation that is too close. To help, McCall urges that there are two kinds 
of perichoresis—one for inter-Trinity relations, and the other for God-cos-
mos relations, which he defines (170, 172). This reader was unable to see 
how these constitute two species under any shared genus.
Chapter 6 enters the recent debate among evangelical theologians con-
cerning whether or not the Son is eternally “subordinate to” the Father. 
This thesis, he argues, is either trivial or inconsistent with the creedal 
claim that the two are homoousias (175–180). Further, proponents like 
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Grudem and Ware on unclear about which version they really want to 
defend (188). In the end McCall pleads that this issue be held separate 
from debates about the proper roles of women in church life.
Chapter 7 discusses Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas’s claims that 
“nothing in existence is conceivable in itself . . . since even God exists 
thanks to an event of communion” (190); “there is no true being without 
communion” (191), and “love . . . is constitutive of his [God’s] substance” 
(192). McCall discusses these startling claims under the banner “Being as 
Communion.” They seem to entail that it is metaphysically impossible 
that there be only one thing, and that it is impossible for there to be a self 
not in a personal relationship with at least one other self. McCall might 
have demanded arguments to back these claims up, discussing prima facie 
counterexamples (respectively: God, a lifelong human hermit atheist—
say, Christopher Hitchens raised by wolves).
McCall too is entranced by this picture of God as fundamentally an 
eternal, perfect, three-way friendship. Thus he accepts “Being as Commu-
nion” but argues that it is in conflict with another thesis to which Ziziou-
las is committed, what McCall dubs the “Sovereignty-Aseity Conviction.” 
This is the claim that God and only God exists a se—independently, or 
solely through himself, everything else depending on him. In Zizioulas’s 
view, only God—that is, the Father—exists a se, and he is radically free—
not only creation, but even the existence of the Son and Spirit depend on 
his free choice. Thus, the Trinity exists contingently, and dependently on 
the Father (193, 196).
McCall argues that this ascription of aseity only to the Father amounts 
to an objectionable subordinationism. In his view, “Traditional affirma-
tions of subordination have revolved around the ‘function’ of the Son” 
(198). He argues that Zizioulas should keep the “Being as Communion” 
thesis, as it is “central to the teaching of Scripture and the Christian tradi-
tion” (205). But he should ascribe aseity not to the Father alone, but rather 
to the Trinity, holding it to be implied by the property divinity (207). Fur-
ther, the notion of aseity should be clarified—we should re-define it to 
mean a lack of dependence on anything which is not divine (209). Thus, both 
the Trinity and each of the Persons exist a se. But, preserving the “Being as 
Communion” theme, each person depends for his existence on the other 
two—existing as a person only because of their relation to another.
What happened to the patristic “generation” and “procession” claims, 
which seem to entail that the Son and Spirit both exist because of the 
Father? McCall’s response is to redefine the sentence “the Father eternally 
generates the Son”:
eternal generation refers us to (a) the incompleteness of the persons as indi-
viduals and (b) their complete and irreducible uniqueness in relation to the 
other persons. Seen this way, the doctrine of eternal generation emphasizes 
that to be a person—even a divine person—is to be incomplete “alone” or in 
oneself. (212–213)
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Chapter 8 is McCall’s manifesto for trinitarian theology, some “theses 
for scholastic disputation” (219). I highlight just a few: We should think 
critically about alleged social and political implications of trinitarian doc-
trine (225–227). Appeals to mystery cannot atone for doctrines which are 
“obviously inconsistent” (228); Trinity doctrines must be “coherent (or at 
least not obviously incoherent)” (229) as well as biblically and creedally 
kosher. But theologians “need not undertake to show how God is three 
and one. Indeed, to attempt to do so reeks of hubris” (232). This seems in-
consistent with his friendliness towards any attempt to construct a coher-
ent metaphysical model of the Trinity. Doesn’t a response to the threeness-
oneness problem entail an answer to the “how” question?
Another important assertion is that “Christian theological commitments 
should receive priority . . . if our intuitions about ‘theism’ and ‘mono-
theism’ conflict with the central elements of Trinitarian doctrine, then so 
much the worse for our intuitions about such things!” (233). It is hard to 
argue that if something is known to be divine revelation, it may be reason-
ably believed even if it conflicts with our prior commitments. But exactly 
what are these central elements?
McCall nowhere explicitly advances his preferred Trinity theory. But 
the outlines are clear enough. “The” Trinity theory, for McCall, involves 
three distinct “centers of consciousness and will” (12, 87–89, 236)—what 
I would call so many selves—capable of personal relationships with one 
another. Their status is absolutely (ontologically) equal, and each depends 
for his existence as a self on the others. These, in some sense, are the one, 
triune God. This “God” is not a self, though it is “truly personal” (93–94), 
and so it has personal properties—or at least, it has parts which do. (Mis-
leadingly, but following other recent social theorists, McCall refers to it 
throughout using personal pronouns.) But are not three equally divine 
selves three gods? No, for it is only Bauckham’s idea (which McCall agrees 
is also the first-century Jewish idea) of monotheism which is relevant and 
Bauckham thinks it (this special New Testament era “monotheism,” the 
content of which is never spelled out) is consistent with trinitarian devel-
opments (233–236), we assume, even “social” ones.
Here most philosophers will balk; Bauckham’s claim cries out for clari-
fication. Is not Jesus portrayed in the New Testament as someone other than 
God, someone who prays to and depends on God, who does God’s bid-
ding? On the other hand, isn’t Jesus supposed to be “God incarnate,” God 
himself, in human form? Is God who Jesus is? Bauckham often writes as if 
God and Jesus are the same self. And yet, Jesus is in his words “included in 
the identity” of God, which suggests that they are not. He sometimes sug-
gests that the Father is also so included. Through this cloudy lens, McCall 
would have us view the New Testament witness about God and Christ. 
But this claim, no less than speculative flights about perichoresis, is in need 
of careful analysis and evaluation. McCall himself, not holding God to be 
a self, won’t say that God and Jesus are the same self. In what sense, then, 
is Jesus “in God’s identity”?
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McCall makes some excellent points about monotheism and the Trin-
ity. It won’t imply monotheism, he says, to say merely that there’s one 
generic divine essence, that there’s only one divine “family,” that there’s 
only one font of divinity (the Father), or that the Three are united by a 
mysterious relation of “periochoresis” (241–242). Amen to all that.
My biggest criticism of the book is its friendliness towards theoretical 
solutions, which crucially depend on bold, arguably ad hoc re-definitions. 
Yet it is clearly written, sober, insightful, and rich with argument. As in-
tended, it gives theologians and philosophers some important things to 
argue about together.
Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, ed. Oliver D. 
Crisp and Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 316. 
$45 (paperback).
PAUL C. ANDERS, Mount Marty College
This is an important and informative collection of essays that I expect will 
be highly influential, and which I highly recommend. However, reading 
these essays is somewhat frustrating. The frustration centers on a set of 
interrelated ambiguities that run throughout the collection. Some of these 
ambiguities are unavoidable, but others should be disambiguated and are 
not, at least not to the degree one might expect from an analytic treatment 
of analytic theology. In what follows, I focus on two concerns: just what 
constitutes analytic theology and whether analytic theology is meant to be 
only descriptive, or normative as well.
In the introduction, Michael Rea makes two important distinctions. 
First, while analytic theology is based on the methods of analytic phi-
losophy, these methods are applied not to natural language analysis as 
in early analytic philosophy, but to metaphysical systems or worldviews. 
Second, to refer to the methods of analytic philosophy in contemporary 
usage is more about a particular style of philosophy with an associated 
set of desiderata—clarity, rigor, and logical argumentation being fun-
damental. As such, analytic theology can allow for much variety with 
respect to content and method. Analytic theology may be better thought 
of as an attitude toward theological methods as opposed to a way of do-
ing theology.
The first two essays in part one are focused on the nature of analytic 
theology, but are less than direct in their conclusions concerning normativ-
ity. In “On Analytic Theology,” Thomas Crisp uses a distinction by Peter 
Strawson between descriptive and revisionist metaphysics. Descriptive 
metaphysics seeks merely to understand the current status of a conceptual 
system. Revisionist metaphysics offers an alternative to the current system. 
Crisp envisions analytic theology as descriptive partly because it seeks to 
